A guest post by Abdelhamid Taha, a financial regulation specialist with over a decade of operational experience in AML and compliance at HSBC, including during the bank’s US Deferred Prosecution Agreement period. He is a Member of the Secretariat Committee of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Investment Fraud & Fairer Financial Services. He writes in a personal capacity.
This annex accompanies Big4News’s two-part Analysis series on Market Financial Solutions (MFS).
Part 1 — £1.8 Billion and Borrowed Trust: The MFS Structure No One Was Mandated to See Whole
Part 2 — £1.8 Billion and Borrowed Trust: The Limits of Institutional Oversight
It maps the principal factual claims and documentary foundations in the series to primary records, regulatory materials and reporting.
The annex is evidentiary rather than argumentative. ‘What it establishes’ describes the proposition supported by the cited material and deliberately avoids attributing motives that the source itself does not prove. Where administrators, creditors or other parties make allegations, those allegations are identified as such. Where a source is a media report, it is distinguished from a primary filing or regulatory finding.
The public record does not reveal the full audit working papers, lender due diligence, internal bank communications, legal advice or confidential regulatory material. Accordingly, the absence of a fact from the public record should not be treated as proof that no work was performed or no issue was considered.
The Financial Reporting Council’s MFS-related investigations remain open. The FRC has stated that opening an investigation does not indicate that it has made, or will make, any finding of breach or misconduct. Paresh Raja’s spokesperson has denied fraud and dishonesty allegations and has said that assets administrators characterise as missing were held through nominee structures for the benefit of MFS and its creditors.
Last editorial verification: 01 September 2026.
How to read this annex
Each entry contains the source, a short statement of what it establishes, and where it is used in the series. Sources consulted during reporting but not relied upon in the final articles have been omitted.
Contents
1. Regulatory and official sources
Financial Conduct Authority - Investigation into Market Financial Solutions Limited (20 March 2026)
Source link: FCA statement
What it establishes: The FCA opened an enforcement investigation into Market Financial Solutions Limited (MFS). It states that MFS is an Annex 1 business registered and supervised by the FCA solely for compliance with the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, and that Annex 1 registered firms are not authorised or subject to wider FCA regulation.
Used in the series: Both parts - the limits of the FCA perimeter and the status of the continuing FCA investigation.
Financial Conduct Authority - FCA highlights risks when dealing with unregulated lenders (20 March 2026)
Source link: FCA statement
What it establishes: The FCA said there were around 1,200 Annex 1 firms registered solely for anti-money-laundering purposes; its powers over them were limited to AML compliance and its wider rulebook did not apply. It also said it had followed up with 300 firms in late 2025 and reminded regulated firms to conduct appropriate checks on unregulated lenders and counterparties.
Used in the series: Part 1 - regulatory perimeter and due-diligence context; Part 2 - background to the FCA’s later supervisory response.
Financial Conduct Authority - FCA applying increased scrutiny to Annex 1 firms (7 August 2026)
Source link: FCA statement
What it establishes: The FCA identified financial-crime concerns among Annex 1 firms, including over-reliance on parent-company controls and risks associated with unregulated lending through complex structures such as SPVs. It announced closer scrutiny of new applications and said it had sent information requests to around 900 existing firms; together with work on 300 firms in late 2025, it said all registered Annex 1 firms had been contacted. The statement does not name MFS.
Used in the series: Part 2 - the FCA’s post-collapse supervisory response and the distinction between increased scrutiny and a change to the regulatory perimeter.
Financial Reporting Council - Investigations into accountants, auditors and firms in relation to MFS and connected companies (11 June 2026)
Source link: FRC press notice
What it establishes: The FRC announced four investigations: the conduct of Magus Chartered Accountants and two individual accountants; the conduct of another individual accountant; Berkeley Finch Limited’s statutory audit of MFS for 2024; and Silver Levene (UK) Limited’s statutory audit of Zircon Group Limited’s 2024 consolidated financial statements. The FRC expressly states that opening an investigation does not indicate that it has made, or will make, any finding of breach or misconduct.
Used in the series: Both parts - the precise scope and status of the audit and accountancy investigations.
Financial Reporting Council - Auditor’s Responsibilities for the Audit
Source link: FRC guidance
What it establishes: The FRC describes an auditor’s objective as obtaining reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. It also describes the requirements to exercise professional judgement and scepticism, assess risks and obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, not a guarantee.
Used in the series: Part 2 - the discussion of what a statutory audit is designed to do and the distinction between audit execution and the limits of audit scope.
Financial Reporting Council - ISA (UK) 240, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements (Revised May 2021; updated May 2022)
Source link: Applicable standard
What it establishes: This was the applicable fraud standard for the 2024 audits discussed in the series. It requires professional scepticism, identification and assessment of risks of material misstatement due to fraud, and appropriate audit responses. Paragraph 15-1 requires compliance with the relevant requirements of ISA (UK) 550 on related parties when obtaining evidence about fraud risk. The standard does not, by itself, establish what procedures Berkeley Finch or Silver Levene performed in these engagements.
Used in the series: Both parts - the professional framework against which the public audit reports and the open FRC investigations are discussed.
Financial Reporting Council — ISA (UK) 220 (Revised July 2021), Quality Management for an Audit of Financial Statements
Source link: https://www.frc.org.uk/library/standards-codes-policy/audit-assurance-and-ethics/auditing-standards/isa-uk-220/
What it establishes: ISA (UK) 220 sets engagement-level requirements concerning quality management, including the engagement partner’s responsibility for determining that sufficient and appropriate resources are assigned or made available to the engagement. It provides the relevant professional framework for Part 2’s discussion of audit-team resources. The standard does not establish what resources were actually assigned to any MFS-related audit.
Used in the series: Part 2 — audit resourcing and engagement-level quality-management requirements.
Financial Reporting Council — Revised Ethical Standard 2019
Source link: FRC Ethical Standard page
What it establishes: The Revised Ethical Standard 2019 provides the relevant UK independence and ethical framework for the 2024-period audit engagements discussed in Part 1. It is relevant to questions about relationships or financial interests that may bear on auditor independence. The existence of a relationship or an audit fee does not, by itself, establish a breach or fee-dependency threat. The later 2024 Ethical Standard became effective from 15 December 2024 and allowed engagements for periods commencing before that date to be completed under the existing standard.
Used in the series: Part 1 — context for the independence question raised by media reporting concerning Berkeley Finch’s principal.
Bank of England - Eligible collateral framework
Source link: Eligible collateral
What it establishes: The Bank publishes the framework and datasets for collateral eligible in its market operations, including Level C collateral. The page links to the eligible-securities data and to the Bank’s guidance for loan collateral.
Used in the series: Part 2 — the Bank’s general eligible-collateral framework and the context in which the Level C securities data are published.
Bank of England — Level C eligible securities dataset
Source link: Level C eligible securities data
What it establishes: The Bank publishes security-level data identifying securities eligible as Level C collateral under its Sterling Monetary Framework. The publicly available dataset provides information about individual eligible securities but does not itself identify Corporate Services Providers such as Intertrust/CSC or Maples. It therefore cannot, on its own, support a provider-by-provider aggregation of Level C collateral or establish the Bank’s exposure to particular third-party service providers.
Used in the series: Part 2 — the distinction between what can be established from the Bank’s public security-level dataset and the separate portfolio-aggregation question raised by the FOI response.
Bank of England - Guide to Pre-positioning Loan Collateral
Source link: Bank guidance
What it establishes: The Bank’s published process includes due diligence intended to allow it to value and risk-manage loan collateral and to take legal ownership if necessary. The framework includes documentation, legal review and data-verification processes. This source is important because it prevents the FOI response below from being read as evidence that the Bank performs no underlying collateral due diligence.
Used in the series: Part 2 - qualification of the Bank of England ‘visibility’ point.
Bank of England - Freedom of Information response CAS-028671 (27 July 2026)
Status: Private correspondence provided to Big4News; not published on the Bank’s FOI disclosure log.
Source link: Not publicly available.
What it establishes: The request sought the aggregate value of eligible Level C collateral where Intertrust/CSC or Maples was recorded as Corporate Services Provider. The Bank replied: ‘Following reasonable searches, we can confirm that the Bank does not hold information within scope of your request.’ The response establishes only that the Bank did not hold the requested aggregate information; it does not establish that the Bank performs no due diligence on the underlying collateral.
Used in the series: Part 2 — the narrow question of whether the Bank held the specific requested aggregation by named Corporate Services Providers. The response should not be read as establishing that the Bank lacks other systems, information or means of monitoring concentration or third-party dependencies.
2. Corporate filings and insolvency records
Market Financial Solutions Limited (05994359) - annual accounts, including 2016 and 2024
Source link: Companies House filing history
What it establishes: The filed accounts document MFS’s growth and its reported financial position. The 2024 accounts report turnover of about £71.6 million, profit after tax of about £7.6 million, net assets of about £15.9 million, 149 average employees and a group loan book of approximately £2.4 billion. Berkeley Finch signed an unqualified audit opinion dated 31 March 2025; the accounts disclose an audit fee of £72,375. The 2016 accounts provide the earlier-scale comparison used in Part 1.
Used in the series: Both parts - scale, growth, auditor identity, audit opinion and audit-fee context.
Market Financial Solutions Limited - October 2019 special resolution and amended Articles of Association
Source link: Companies House filing history
What it establishes: The amended articles permitted a director with a personal interest in a matter to be counted in the quorum and to vote on that matter, subject to the terms of the articles. The filing establishes the governance rule; it does not establish the purpose for which the amendment was adopted or that it was used improperly in any particular transaction.
Used in the series: Both parts - the discussion of concentrated governance and conflicts within the MFS structure.
Market Financial Solutions Limited - Joint Administrators’ Proposals (filed 29 April 2026)
Source link: Market Financial Solutions Limited — Joint Administrators’ Proposals, filed 29 April 2026
What it establishes: The administrators estimate a total group deficiency of £1,807,612,828 and describe their investigation into the group’s affairs. The proposal and related insolvency filings are primary sources for the administrators’ allegations and estimates, including alleged diversion of loan income, alleged double-pledging, recovery actions and the chronology of the collapse. These are insolvency findings and allegations, not final judicial determinations of fraud or liability.
Used in the series: Both parts - the £1.8 billion figure, collapse chronology, allegations, recovery actions and scope limitations.
Zircon Bridging Limited (11168447) and Amber Bridging Limited (13664578) - 2024 annual accounts
Source links: Zircon filing history | Amber filing history
What it establishes: The 2024 accounts report loan books of approximately £458.4 million for Zircon and £579.5 million for Amber. Silver Levene (UK) Limited issued unqualified audit opinions. The public audit reports identify inappropriate journal entries as a fraud risk. The public reports do not reveal the full contents of the audit working papers.
Used in the series: Both parts - SPV scale, the split audit perimeter and the limits of what can be inferred from public audit reports.
Zircon Bridging Limited and Amber Bridging Limited - 2022 amendments to Articles of Association
Source links: Zircon filing history | Amber filing history
What it establishes: The filings amended the companies’ governance arrangements, including provisions allowing a quorum of one where only one director was in office. Amber’s amendment also altered provisions concerning share transfers. The filings establish the governance rules; they do not establish improper intent.
Used in the series: Part 1 - governance structure of the principal SPVs.
Zircon Bridging Limited and Amber Bridging Limited - registered security in favour of Intertrust Trustees Limited
Source links: Zircon charge | Amber charge
What it establishes: The charge records identify Intertrust Trustees Limited as Security Agent and record fixed and floating security and negative-pledge provisions. The charge documents were prepared by Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. These records establish the formal security architecture, not how the security operated in practice or its ultimate ranking in insolvency.
Used in the series: Both parts - the role of the Security Agent and the formal security structure around Zircon and Amber.
Zircon Bridging Limited and Amber Bridging Limited - Joint Administrators’ Proposals (filed April 2026)
Source links: Zircon filing history | Amber filing history
What it establishes: The proposals record major documentation gaps. For Zircon, administrators reported 525 loans with a stated value of £552.6 million but located documentation for 98 loans worth £98.4 million. For Amber, they reported 191 loans worth £691 million but located documentation for 28 loans worth £213.4 million. These figures show that documentation could not be located for most of the reported books; they do not, by themselves, prove that every undocumented underlying loan did not exist. The proposals also record payment and cash-flow issues relevant to the collapse timeline.
Used in the series: Both parts - loan-documentation gaps, cash-flow chronology and the scale of post-collapse reconstruction.
Intertrust Trustees Limited (07359549) - annual accounts and audit-exemption filings
Source link: Companies House filing history
What it establishes: The filing history records that Intertrust Trustees Limited relied on the Companies Act 2006 section 479A subsidiary audit exemption and a parent-company guarantee. It was therefore not subject to a standalone statutory audit for the relevant periods. The filings also provide the company’s reported financial information. They do not establish that no other form of assurance, review or group-level audit work ever touched the company.
Used in the series: Both parts - the distinction between the Security Agent’s legal entity and the wider Intertrust/CSC group, and the absence of a standalone statutory audit.
Intertrust Holdings (UK) Limited, now CSC ITG Holdings Limited (06263011) - consolidated accounts
Source link: Intertrust Holdings (UK) Limited — group accounts for year ended 31 December 2016
What it establishes: The parent group’s 2016 consolidated accounts disclose the acquisition of Intertrust Trustees Limited for £1. The parent filings also provide the corporate context for the guarantee supporting the subsidiary audit exemption. The £1 purchase price should be attributed to the parent-group accounts, not treated as proof of the Security Agent’s economic value or operational capacity.
Used in the series: Part 1 and the Part 2 recap - provenance of the £1 acquisition figure.
Intertrust Trustees Limited - amended Articles of Association and director filings
Source link: Companies House filing history
What it establishes: The articles permit holders of a majority of ordinary shares to appoint or remove directors by written notice. Companies House also records batches of director appointments and resignations during the life of the MFS-related mandates. These records establish shareholder appointment powers and changes in board composition; they do not displace directors’ statutory duties or establish that lenders were unaware of those changes.
Used in the series: Part 1 - corporate-governance context for the Security Agent.
Intertrust Trustees Limited - compulsory strike-off notice and discontinuance (7-8 March 2023)
Source link: Companies House filing history, page 2
What it establishes: Companies House records a First Gazette notice for compulsory strike-off on 7 March 2023 and a notice on 8 March 2023 that the compulsory strike-off action had been discontinued. The company was not dissolved and was not subsequently restored.
Used in the series: Part 2 — corporate-history context only. This one-day episode is not relied upon as evidence of substantive failure by Intertrust Trustees Limited.
Trident Funding Limited (15894362) - Joint Administrators’ Proposals
Source link: Companies House filing history
What it establishes: The administrators report that approximately £21.1 million was held in collection accounts with Barclays and that, on 23 April 2026, the court ordered the relevant amounts to be transferred by 8 May. This is an earlier MFS-linked court outcome; without the full legal and factual basis it should not be described as a binding precedent for the later MFS Limited litigation against Barclays.
Used in the series: Part 2 - context for the later Barclays accounts litigation.
3. Regulatory actions involving other Intertrust group entities
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority - administrative fine against Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited (2021)
Source link: CIMA notice
What it establishes: CIMA imposed administrative fines totalling CI$4,232,607.50 on Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited for AML-related breaches. This was a different legal entity in a different jurisdiction from Intertrust Trustees Limited, the MFS Security Agent.
Used in the series: Part 1 - group-level compliance context only. It is not evidence of misconduct by Intertrust Trustees Limited in relation to MFS.
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier - administrative sanction against Intertrust (Luxembourg) S.a r.l. (30 November 2022)
Source link: CSSF notice
What it establishes: The CSSF imposed a EUR198,750 fine on Intertrust (Luxembourg) S.a r.l. concerning IT-risk management, internal governance, professional secrecy and regulatory-communication obligations. The sanction was imposed on a separate Luxembourg entity, not on Intertrust Trustees Limited.
Used in the series: Part 1 - group-level compliance context only.
De Nederlandsche Bank - fine against Intertrust (Netherlands) B.V. (10 January 2024)
Source link: DNB enforcement notice
What it establishes: DNB imposed a EUR2.5 million administrative fine on Intertrust (Netherlands) B.V. for insufficient customer due diligence. The decision concerns a separate Dutch trust-office entity and does not establish a failure by Intertrust Trustees Limited in the MFS mandates.
Used in the series: Part 1 - group-level compliance context only.
Intertrust N.V. — FY2021 results
What it establishes: Intertrust reported €13.8 million of specific one-off costs associated with remediation activities, the Cayman Islands regulatory fine and other legal and compliance matters. This is group-level financial and compliance context and does not establish any failure by Intertrust Trustees Limited in relation to MFS.
Used in the series: Part 1 — wider Intertrust group compliance and remediation context.
4. Media and secondary reporting
Financial Times - MFS auditors investigated by UK accountancy regulator
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Independent reporting on the FRC investigations and on Berkeley Finch’s small-firm profile, used alongside the FRC’s own announcement and Companies House records.
Used in the series: Both parts - audit-firm context and investigation chronology.
Financial Times - reporting on MFS’s audit architecture and the Ajay Yadav mortgage issue
Source links: Audit-architecture report | Ajay Yadav reporting
What it establishes: The reports describe the use of several small accountancy firms across the wider MFS network and report the allegation that Berkeley Finch principal Ajay Yadav held mortgages from a Raja-linked entity with MFS identified as manager. The mortgage issue is media-reported and has not been treated in the series as a finding of an independence breach.
Used in the series: Part 1 - audit architecture and the qualified independence question.
Financial Times — reporting linking the FCA’s increased Annex 1 scrutiny to the MFS collapse
Source link: https://www.ft.com/content/0edbd013-dc35-494b-b7e7-9a745af01c9d
What it establishes: Reports the FCA’s 7 August 2026 announcement of increased scrutiny of Annex 1 firms in the context of concerns arising from the collapse of MFS. This source is important because the FCA’s own 7 August statement does not name MFS; the connection between the announcement and MFS is therefore attributed to the Financial Times rather than presented as a statement made by the FCA itself.
Used in the series: Part 1 — attribution of the MFS connection to the Financial Times; Part 2 — where the FCA’s post-collapse response is discussed in the context of MFS.
Financial Times — reporting on MFS’s institutional funding structure
Source link: https://www.ft.com/content/32f419d5-293c-427b-bb2a-77d730775e0e
What it establishes: Identifies institutional lenders behind the Zircon and Amber facilities, including Atlas SP Partners, TPG Angelo Gordon and Avenue Capital, and provides context on the institutional financing of the MFS SPVs. The reporting establishes the identities and structure of the funding relationships; it does not establish what due diligence each lender performed.
Used in the series: Part 1 — institutional funding architecture and lender identities.
Financial Times - Barclays blocked transactions linked to property lender MFS months before collapse
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports that Barclays began blocking certain MFS-linked transactions in late 2025 and froze accounts in January 2026. It also reports that the collapse of First Brands and Tricolor prompted additional scrutiny of MFS exposures, including enhanced due diligence by Castlelake.
Used in the series: Both parts - Barclays chronology, transactional visibility and the background to intensified lender due diligence.
Financial Times — NCA freeze of properties linked to Saifuzzaman Chowdhury
Source link: https://www.ft.com/content/53aa0057-2db4-4d0a-9459-05d30bc3c771
What it establishes: Reports that the National Crime Agency froze 342 properties linked to Saifuzzaman Chowdhury, valued at approximately £185 million, as part of an ongoing civil investigation. The reporting provides context on links between parts of Chowdhury’s UK property portfolio and MFS. The NCA action is not presented as a finding against MFS.
Used in the series: Part 1 — pre-collapse warning-sign chronology and NCA context.
Bloomberg - Wells Fargo Lent to UK’s MFS as Barclays Exited Deal, Froze Accounts (22 April 2026)
Source link: Bloomberg
What it establishes: Bloomberg reports that an MFS-linked company borrowed about £143 million from Wells Fargo in a deal that closed in late November 2025 and that Barclays was repaid roughly the same amount after Barclays had begun restricting MFS-linked activity.
Used in the series: Both parts - the refinancing chronology. The source does not establish what Wells Fargo was told or what Barclays was legally required to disclose.
The Telegraph - reporting on Barclays, the MFS whistleblower and the late-2025 restructuring
Source link: The Telegraph
What it establishes: The Telegraph reports that Barclays was alerted by a whistleblower, attempted a restructuring and reduced part of its exposure through a refinancing. Its account is used as media reporting of internal chronology, not as a judicial or regulatory finding about Barclays’ duties.
Used in the series: Part 1 - Barclays chronology and what was reported about its response before the collapse.
Financial Times - Collapsed mortgage lender MFS was given all-clear in 2024 FCA review
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports that a 2024 skilled-person review carried out by DWF found MFS operating in line with UK AML requirements while recommending potential improvements. The same reporting provides context on MFS lending linked to Saifuzzaman Chowdhury and the separate National Crime Agency civil investigation into assets linked to him.
Used in the series: Both parts - AML supervision, the DWF review and the distinction between MFS’s regulatory status and wider risks.
FStech - UK watchdog investigates auditors linked to collapsed lender MFS (12 June 2026)
Source link: FStech
What it establishes: Reports the FRC investigations and provides an on-record response from Raja’s spokesperson: assets administrators characterise as missing were said to have been held through nominee structures for the benefit of MFS and its creditors, and Raja was said to maintain that there was no fraud or dishonesty.
Used in the series: Both parts - Raja’s response to the allegations and the scope-and-limitations language.
Financial Times - reporting on the civil claim and worldwide freezing orders against Paresh Raja
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports on administrators’ civil claims and freezing orders. The series treats the underlying allegations as allegations and does not present the civil proceedings as findings of fraud or liability.
Used in the series: Part 1 - litigation and recovery context; Part 2 - what happens next.
Financial Times - reporting on administrators’ allegations of ‘systematic plundering’
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports language used in administrators’ High Court allegations concerning MFS. The phrase is attributable to the administrators’ case and is not an adjudicated finding.
Used in the series: Part 1 - only where the article expressly attributes the allegation to the administrators.
Financial Times — reporting on MFS-linked insolvencies
Source link: https://www.ft.com/content/2326b52c-9dc4-43d4-8e1f-f61429ff365b
What it establishes: Reports, using Insolvency Service data, that more than 100 MFS-connected real-estate companies entered administration during March 2026.
Used in the series: Part 1 — scale of the insolvency fallout following the MFS collapse.
Financial Times - MFS administrators sue Barclays after accounts access frozen
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports MFS Limited’s claim seeking access to frozen accounts. Barclays held about £160 million across accounts tied to various MFS entities, while the amount attributable specifically to MFS Limited was unclear; Barclays has asserted set-off rights and is defending the claim.
Used in the series: Part 2 - the current Barclays litigation.
Financial Times and Bloomberg Law - institutional creditor exposures
Source links: Financial Times - Elliott | Bloomberg Law - Elliott, SMBC and Macquarie
What it establishes: The reports identify material exposures held by sophisticated institutional creditors, including Elliott Management, SMBC and Macquarie. The reporting supports the identities and approximate exposures; it does not establish what due diligence each institution performed or what each relied upon before lending.
Used in the series: Part 2 - creditor sophistication and the breadth of institutional involvement.
Financial Times - reporting on early post-collapse legal costs
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports that Kirkland & Ellis accumulated about £4.4 million in legal fees during the first eight weeks after the collapse. This is not compared on a like-for-like basis with audit fees; it is used only to illustrate the cost of post-collapse reconstruction and litigation.
Used in the series: Part 2 - ‘The Price of Borrowed Trust’.
Financial Times Alphaville - reporting on the sale of Paresh Raja’s supercars
Source link: Financial Times
What it establishes: Reports the High Court-authorised sale of eight supercars for a total of £1.625 million as part of the recovery process.
Used in the series: Part 2 - recovery efforts and current proceedings.
Business Sale - Market Financial Solutions: the bridging lender that entered administration despite posting record profits (22 February 2026)
Source link: Business Sale
What it establishes: Reports director departures in the period before administration and records MFS’s public description of its difficulties as arising from a temporary restriction on access to banking facilities following a procedural matter with its primary banking provider. The director dates can also be checked against Companies House officer filings.
Used in the series: Part 1 - governance chronology and MFS’s own public explanation immediately before administration.
5. Legal and regulatory perimeter sources
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 - Article 61A
Source link: Legislation.gov.uk
What it establishes: Article 61A contains exclusions relevant to investment-property and other business lending. It is part of the statutory framework explaining why some property-backed lending falls outside the regulated-mortgage-contract regime. It should not be read as meaning that all bridging lending is unregulated.
Used in the series: Part 1 - legal basis for the regulatory-perimeter discussion.
FCA Handbook - PERG 4.4: What is a regulated mortgage contract?
Source link: FCA Handbook
What it establishes: The FCA guidance explains the 40% dwelling test, commercial-property treatment and exclusions for commercial borrowers and certain bridging loans. It confirms that the regulatory treatment depends on the nature and use of the secured property and the borrower/transaction, not simply on the label ‘bridging loan’.
Used in the series: Part 1 - explanation of why significant parts of MFS’s lending could sit outside full mortgage regulation.
National Westminster Bank plc v Rabobank Nederland [2007] EWHC 1056 (Comm)
Source link: Case report
What it establishes: The merits decision concerned the obligations created by a specific Good Faith Agreement in a particular workout. It is relevant to disclosure arguments in syndicated lending, but it does not establish a universal rule that one lender can never owe disclosure duties to another. Any use in the series is therefore confined to the contractual context of that case.
Used in the series: Part 1 - legal context for the discussion of information sharing among lenders, with the qualification that duties depend on the relevant agreements and facts.
This annex is part of a series of 3 essays:
Part 1 — £1.8 billion and borrowed trust: the MFS structure no one was mandated to see whole
Part 2 — £1.8 billion and borrowed trust: the limits of institutional oversight
Source Annex: £1.8 Billion and Borrowed Trust
This article is part of the Big4News Investigations & Analysis series, which examines the structural forces shaping Deloitte, PwC, EY and KPMG.